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The free energy principle (FEP) has gained widespread interest and growing acceptance 
as a new paradigm of brain function, but has had little impact on the theory and practice 
of psychotherapy. The aim of this paper is to redress this. Brains rely on Bayesian inference 
during which “bottom-up” sensations are matched with “top-down” predictions. 
Discrepancies result in “prediction error.” The brain abhors informational “surprise,” which 
is minimized by (1) action enhancing the statistical likelihood of sensory samples, 
(2) revising inferences in the light of experience, updating “priors” to reality-aligned 
“posteriors,” and (3) optimizing the complexity of our generative models of a capricious 
world. In all three, free energy is converted to bound energy. In psychopathology energy 
either remains unbound, as in trauma and inhibition of agency, or manifests restricted, 
anachronistic “top-down” narratives. Psychotherapy fosters client agency, linguistic and 
practical. Temporary uncoupling bottom-up from top-down automatism and fostering 
scrutinized simulations sets a number of salutary processes in train. Mentalising enriches 
Bayesian inference, enabling experience and feeling states to be “metabolized” and 
assimilated. “Free association” enhances more inclusive sensory sampling, while dream 
analysis foregrounds salient emotional themes as “attractors.” FEP parallels with 
psychoanalytic theory are outlined, including Freud’s unpublished project, Bion’s “contact 
barrier” concept, the Fonagy/Target model of sexuality, Laplanche’s therapist as “enigmatic 
signifier,” and the role of projective identification. The therapy stimulates patients to become 
aware of and revise the priors’ they bring to interpersonal experience. In the therapeutic 
“duet for one,” the energy binding skills and non-partisan stance of the analyst help 
sufferers face trauma without being overwhelmed by psychic entropy. Overall, the FEP 
provides a sound theoretical basis for psychotherapy practice, training, and research.
Keywords: Bayesian brain, psychoanalysis, active inference, psychotherapy, free energy principle, mentalization
INTRODUCTION
It has been established beyond doubt that psychodynamic psychotherapy “works” (Leichsenring, 
2008; Shedler, 2010; Leichsenring et al., 2015; Taylor, 2015). But how? Building on recent advances 
in computational neuroscience, the aim of this paper is to offer a heuristic that can help elucidate 
the underlying mechanisms by which psychotherapies alleviate psychological distress and illness.1
1 We believe that this attempt to elucidate the “neuronal” basis of effective psychotherapy exemplifies the normal 
course of scientific progress. Darwin knew no more about DNA than did Freud about the fMRI-unveiled brain.
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Schröedinger (1944) coined the term “negentropy” to 
characterize the complexity of living matter, i.e., its structured 
heterogeneity and order, in contrast to the entropy of the 
inanimate world under the sway of the second law of 
thermodynamics. Our approach is based on the “free energy” 
(FE) principle developed by Friston as one formulation of “the 
Bayesian Brain” (Friston, 2010; Hobson and Friston, 2012; 
Hohwy, 2013; Friston and Frith, 2015; Hopkins, 2016). Friston 
presupposes that the brain’s aim, like that of the organism as 
a whole, is to maintain homeostasis2 and resist the entropic 
forces of chaos and homogenization. To do this we–along with 
our fellow living creatures–need information about the 
environment, our place within it, and the likely outcomes of 
our actions. The past shapes our futures: based on prior 
experience, we make “top down” predictions about our sensory 
and interoceptive input, based on a model of how they were 
created.3 The discrepancy between these top-down predictions 
and the actuality–and accuracy–of bottom-up sensations is 
“prediction error.” Via perception and action, these unavoidable 
“errors” are “minimized” by converting prior beliefs into posteriors4 
(i.e., the newly assigned probability after the relevant evidence, 
the observed data, is taken into account). This process of Bayesian 
inference simulates past experience and ensures posterior beliefs 
align with newly sampled data.
Prediction error is inescapable for two reasons: first, we  live 
in a constantly changing environment, and second, our sampling 
of that environment is subject to inaccuracy and misperception. 
But this “error” is all to the good –it is the very stuff that 
drives a continuous process of belief-updating and helps build 
adaptive models of the worlds (and bodies) we  inhabit.
The free energy principle (FEP) regards creatures (like us) 
as self-organizing systems that resist a tendency to dissipation 
and disorder. This applies as much to the brain in its search 
for meaning (i.e., informational order) as it does to the body 
as a whole in its pursuit of physical structure and regulation 
(Friston, 2013). This informational slant on “entropy” equates 
to “surprise.”5 If an event is probable to a high degree, the 
surprise when it occurs is minimal and thus little new information 
is gained. We  can therefore be  regarded as creatures that place 
an upper bound on free energy by minimizing their surprise, 
or maximizing the evidence for their models of the world. 
This is sometimes known as self-evidencing (Hohwy, 2016). 
Free energy can be decomposed into complexity minus accuracy. 
2 Sterling (2012) has introduced the term “allostasis” to capture a more 
dynamic version of homeostasis in which an organism anticipates change 
in the internal milieu and sets about counteractive processes and actions.
3 A concept that can be aligned with the psychoanalytic notion of “repetition 
compulsivity” (Barratt, 2016), or, more poetically, Wordsworth’s child as 
father of the man.
4 The terms derive from Kant’s a priori and a posteriori.
5 Surprise is defined as the negative log-probability of an outcome, i.e., how 
“likely” or “unlikely” a particular event, from a specific organism’s viewpoint 
to occur. The brain cannot compute “surprise” as such, but free energy 
can be  evaluated and by “active inference.” Active inference depends on 
two key processes: modifying sensory input “bottom-up” from sensory 
epithelia, including the interoceptive, affect-triggering receptors, (Barrett, 
2017), and “top-down” from the cortex – and at intermediate levels in 
between.
Accuracy refers to our ability to predict sensations, while 
complexity reflects the degrees of freedom used to provide an 
accurate prediction. Model evidence increases by minimizing 
free energy. The accuracy of predictions rises, with a “concomitant 
increase in complexity so that increased model complexity is 
always licensed by an ability to make more accurate predictions” 
(Solms, 2019).
This predictive coding visualises the brain as engaged in 
neuronal–and, as we  shall argue, conceptual–dynamics, that 
minimize free energy by working to reduce prediction errors. 
The latter are the difference between sensory input and predictions 
of that input based upon expectations about states of the world 
created by a pre-existing “generative model.” Resolving prediction 
errors updates prior beliefs by converting them into posterior 
beliefs. The empirical evidence from neuroscience suggests that 
this process rests upon (forward or “bottom-up”) prediction 
errors that ascend brain hierarchies from the low sensory levels 
to high levels of deep generative models (Carhart-Harris and 
Friston, 2010). For example, the number of “top-down” efferent 
neurons targeting the eye far exceeds the “bottom-up” afferent 
number ascending brain-ward. Descending predictions try to 
resolve prediction errors at each hierarchical level, thereby 
providing an accurate account of sensations, in a minimally 
complex fashion.
The FEP provides a model to think about belief updating 
and what this might entail. The binding of free energy equates 
to the resolution of prediction errors (i.e., surprise and 
uncertainty). Thus, the conversion of free into bound energy 
results from belief-updating to increase the accuracy–or decrease 
the complexity–associated with our beliefs about the world’s 
states of affairs.
In sum, Friston maintains that the brain’s main aim is to 
minimize “surprise”–as best it can.
Prediction error is minimized in two main ways:
 1.  Action, which reduces prediction errors by selectively 
sampling sensations that are the least surprising,6 thereby 
helping to approximate the organism to its environmental 
niche, or affordance (see below).
 2.  Perception. Changed perceptions follow from belief updating 
resulting in more reality-consonant predictions.
Both action and perception operate semi-instantaneously–in 
the twinkling of an eye. In the longer term, the structure of 
generative models are, in health, continuously being updated, 
especially their complexity. How this plays out in psychopathology 
are main themes of this article. Much of our focus will be  on 
what Friston and collaborators call “structure learning” (Tervo 
et  al., 2016; Friston et  al., 2017; Gershman, 2017; Isomura 
and Friston, 2018), namely, learning the repertoire or narratives 
that constitute our prior beliefs–or hypotheses–about how our 
world works, and how these might be influenced therapeutically. 
Although the FEP applies to these structural priors, getting 
them right can be  a tricky business. If we  have too many 
6 This a key point of intersection between Bayesian predictive processing 
theories and “embodied enactive” models of the mind which prevail in 
cognitive science (Hohwy, 2013; Kirchhoff, 2017).
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prior hypotheses, our models are too complex and will not 
generalize in a capricious and changing world. Conversely, if 
we  have overly simplistic models, with an insufficient number 
of priors to call upon we  will fail to predict our sensations 
accurately. In both cases, free energy increases and we  fail as 
self-evidencing creatures. We  shall argue that psychopathology 
largely resides in the discrepancy between the experience of 
uncertainty and the paucity or defectiveness of procedures 
needed to reduce it.
It is important to note that minimizing surprise does not 
equate to stasis or clinging to the status quo. First, the internal 
milieu, i.e., physiology is constantly changing and so interoceptive 
prediction error will drive appetitive, safety-seeking, and 
reproductive behaviors (Seth, 2015) exploiting an innate system 
whose prediction postulates that “engagement with a source 
of uncertainty provides maximal opportunities to resolve that 
uncertainty” (Solms, 2019). Second, organisms live in constantly 
changing environments, both in the short- and long term, and 
need creative solutions to adjust and adapt to these. Integral 
to this is the invisible and imperceptible flux of time. This 
aspect of active inference can be  thought of in terms of “time 
out” simulations. By uncoupling prediction and action, the 
mind models the possible outcomes of action in terms of 
expected surprise or uncertainty. Thus active inference furnishes 
building blocks for allostatic adjustment, i.e., “flexible information 
manipulation without the need to commit to particular decisions 
at an early stage of processing” (Knill and Pouget, 2004). Seen 
this way, imaginative exploration and innovation are no less 
surprise-minimizing than ingrained, self-perpetuating, ways of 
explaining the lived world. It is this former aspect that is built 
on and prosthetically enhanced in the social practices 
of psychotherapy.
PSYCHOANALYTIC RESONANCES
At first encounter, this abbreviated account may seem to come 
from a conceptual universe far removed from psychoanalysis. 
Knowing our left from our right hand,7 active inference can 
no doubt reliably discount the chances of a west-rising dawn. 
But knowing about the physics of the world “out there” is 
surely a very different matter to the task of understanding 
oneself and other people? The argument of this paper is, to 
the contrary, that Fristonian principles apply equally, if not 
more so, to the interpersonal realm.
Consider a baby crying for its mother. At times, she is 
there on demand; at others, she is inexplicably delayed. In 
order to make good predictions, a theory of mind is needed–
“maybe she’s tired, angry about my neediness, intoxicated, 
making a new potential rival with Dad.”
The Bayesian brain gradually–and with help–learns to infer 
the causes, affects, motivations, and meanings which shape 
the interpersonal world. Prediction error is built into this 
calculus; this will steer actions, aiming to minimize expected 
7 Many metrics, affective and cognitive, start from the body orientation 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003).
error and therefore, via belief updating, increase the chances 
of our predictions being adaptively correct:
“Mummy, I called you last night when I had a tummy 
ache, but you didn’t come! I thought you had gone away”
“So sorry darling, how horrid! I must have been fast 
asleep. If it happens again you must come through and 
wake me up.” (c.f., Allen et al., 2018)8
Here, the child is being taught the role of action (“come 
through”), interoceptive affect regulation (“So sorry–how horrid”), 
and a relevant hypothesis or prior (“maybe she’s asleep and 
can’t hear me”). Note the conversational or narrative aspect of 
prior/posterior interplay. Vis-a-vis the physical world, action is 
used to minimize the discrepancy between the organism’s model 
and environmental “affordances” (Dennett, 2017) that themselves 
can be  purely epistemic–in the sense of resolving surprise and 
uncertainty. In the interpersonal world, dialogue is not so much 
with physical objects–moving one’s head to get a better view, 
etc.–but with the other, engaged in a reciprocal project of speech 
acts (c.f., Talia et al., 2014). At this level of the Bayesian hierarchy, 
prior beliefs are higher order cognitions (HOCs; Rudrauf, 2014; 
Debbané and Nolte, 2019), initially “borrowed” by infants from 
parents’ minds, based upon their caregiving disposition. We shall 
see how similar processes apply to psychoanalytic work.
This moves the Free Energy approach toward developmental 
and interpersonal conceptions with which psychoanalysis can 
begin to engage. Consider three relevant aspects. First, when 
it comes to precedence in the concept of free energy, Freud 
trumps Friston (Cahart-Harris and Friston, 2010; Solms, 2013). 
In the unpublished “Project” Freud (1895/1950) proposed the 
concepts of “Bindung” and “Entbindung,” i.e., energy “bound” 
and unbound.”9 Freud abandoned his “project,” as he  moved 
toward more psychological models of the mind. However, in 
his 1911 paper Formulations on the Two principles of Mental 
Functioning, he differentiates primary process thinking, in which 
libido seeks discharge, from secondary processes which 
encompass language, sublimation, and ego-mediated restraint. 
The primary processes can be thought of as bottom-up impulses 
(interoceptions) stimulating and interacting with the top-down 
secondary process of affective modulation, verbal representation, 
and logic. For Freud the aim is homeostasis or psychic 
equilibrium, through binding, or if that fails, “discharge” in 
form of symptoms:
“The purpose of the mental apparatus [is] to keep as low 
as possible the total amount of the excitations to which 
it is subject” (Freud, 1925).
Relevant to our later discussion of trauma is emphasis on 
painful memories, which, if unregulated, remain disruptively 
8 For a recent example of a simulated infant learning about mother’s quality 
of caregiving under active inference, see Cittern et  al. (2018).
9 Freud, well versed in classical literature, would have been familiar with 
Aeschylus’ play Prometheus Bound, and perhaps with Shelley’s subversive 
version of the myth, Prometheus Unbound.
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unbound (Freud, 1895/1950). On the free energy view, this 
corresponds to unresolved surprise, uncertainty, or prediction 
errors–all which may be  experienced as mental pain, and 
therefore part of the terrain of psychoanalytic therapy.
Another close parallel is between Friston’s model and 
Bion’s (1962) quasi-mathematical picture of how alpha function 
(i.e., maternal reverie generating top-down predictions) 
processes infants’ “beta elements” (uncontained, unnamed 
bottom-up raw experience) (c.f., Mellor, 2018). This “borrowed 
brain” (Holmes and Slade, 2017) model introduces a vital 
interpersonal dimension to the Bayesian process. Parental 
mentalizing–seeing, understanding, and resonating with 
their  infants’ affects–is initially non-verbal and implicit: 
communicated by facial expression, tone of voice, affiliative 
touch, swinging rhythms of soothing, or stimulation. These 
embodied gestures present a model of the infant from the 
caregiver’s perspective, helping the child to integrate primary 
sensory signals (Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017) into regularities 
of emotional and interpersonal consequences. In the context 
of increasing predictability, the infant explores the environment 
(beginning with the mother’s breast) and the mind of others 
with unconscious phantasies and proto-representations (i.e., 
building a repertoire of Bayesian “priors”). With the help 
of predictable input from the caregiver, the infant brain 
begins to differentiate self versus non-self causes of sensations 
that underwrite a sense of agency and the emergence of 
selfhood (Fonagy et  al., 2002).
This leads us to a third Friston-Freud link: the analysis of 
boundaries. Bion postulated a “contact barrier” between conscious 
and unconscious thought, ensuring that phantasy is sharply 
differentiated from reality–the pleasure from the reality principles, 
the gratifying from the missing–and much-missed–breast.10
Comparably, from a FEP perspective, living entities possess 
a statistically permeable boundary across which occur exchanges–
material and informational–with their surroundings. The mind 
is bounded; at one level, the “world” can only be  known via 
its impression on the sensory epithelium and the belief updating 
entailed by active inference that sensations evoke. This boundary 
(known as a Markov blanket, see Kirchhoff, 2017; Kirchhoff 
et  al., 2018) demarcates any system or creature from the 
environment in which it is immersed and also describes nested 
layers of top-down/bottom-up interfaces within the brain.
The “world” is opaque to the brain except insofar as it 
samples sensations from outside across the Markov blanket, 
matching them with its own internally generated models, 
identifying discrepancies as prediction errors and acting and/
or thinking to minimize them. As seen (felt, smelled, heard, 
propriocepted) through a Markov blanket, “the world” is inferred, 
based on sensation: seeing, feeling, etc. is believing. Markov 
blankets are “nested,” in the sense that boundaries exist not 
just between the mind and its environment, but within the 
body-mind at different levels of complexity and immediacy. 
Bottom-up and top-down processes interact in a hierarchical 
10 The latter two distinctions representing rudimentary generative models 
which, as unconscious phantasies, gradually become imbued with psychic 
meaning.
Helmholtzean fashion throughout the nervous system. Thus, 
believing is also seeing.
Another connection between FEP and the preoccupations 
of psychotherapy is the role of the self. From a FEP perspective, 
the “inner world”–bounded and entropy-defying –necessarily 
entails a model of the environment (Conant and Ashby, 1970)11 
and the organism’s place within it. This presupposes a rudimentary 
“self ” however primitive or unconscious that representation 
might be.12 Enhancing the sense of self–active, authentic, aware, 
and apposite–is a key aim of psychotherapy.
BAYES IN ACTION
Let’s now look now at a quotidian example illustrating the 
Bayesian brain in action, and its relevance to psychotherapy.
One spring morning, in the course of JH’s daily run 
across agricultural land, he noticed that the farmer had 
recently sprayed weed-killer. As he ran, he experienced 
an unpleasant sickly smell and slight feeling of nausea. 
Worried that he might be adversely affected, as he had 
been in previous years, he returned via a detour. The 
following day, following the same course, the smell had 
gone, but he noted in his peripheral vision a dark flapping 
object. His first thought was that this was a bird, perhaps 
a crow, affected by the previous day’s poison; he turned 
his head to engage foveal/central vision, then approached 
to investigate further and if necessary rescue the 
creature. The closer he got to the “object” however, the 
more the putative stricken bird revealed itself to be no 
more than a fragment of wind-blown black plastic, a 
remnant of a discarded fertilizer bag.
This trivial incident illustrates a number of the Bayesian FEPs.
 •  JH’s slight feeling of nausea on the previous day, and knowledge 
of the hazards of weed-spraying, raised the “prior” probability 
of a “sick bird.” This “somatising” mind-set was based on the 
previous day’s nausea.
 •  The “prior,” or meaning attributed to this experience, based 
on selective sampling in peripheral vision and therefore error-
prone, was guided by interoception (the feeling of sickness) 
and the epistemic affordance13 of looking more closely at the 
cause of sensations.
11 See Seth (2015) for a discussion of the psychiatrist Ross Ashby’s early 
contributions to FEP.
12 C.f., O’Keefe (1978) who discovered “place cells” in the hippocampus 
which, like an internal GPS, tells mammals where they are in their world. 
Knowing “who” we are entails, among other information, knowing “where” 
we  are.
13 Gibson defines affordances as “The affordances of the environment are 
what it offers the [individual], what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill… [The word affordance] implies the complementarity of the 
[individual] and the environment.” (Gibson, 1986, p.  127). An “epistemic 
affordance” refers to the meaning of an object or event in the environment, 
in this case a “dark flapping object.”
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 •  The stimulus was ambiguous and, thanks to the inherent 
imprecision of peripheral vision, “noisy”; thus free energy 
minimization was required, via
 1.  Action–turning the head and moving toward the 
“flapping” in order to disambiguate (c.f., Seth, 2015) 
and increase perceptual accuracy–reducing uncertainty 
and subsequent surprise.
 2.  Belief updating–or hypothesis-revision (“the poison 
will have dispelled by today so it would be  odd/
anomalous if this really was stricken bird”).
 •  This active inference, led to a
 •  Posterior belief: a free energy-minimized explanation of 
reality, external (“it’s only flapping plastic”) and internal (“no 
more nausea; I’m not going to get ill”).
We shall return to this example in our discussion 
of transference.
MENTALISING
As already mentioned, integral to active inference is an 
organism’s “sense of self.” In humans and other primates, this 
implies the emergent property of self-awareness (Seth, 2015; 
Seth and Friston, 2016; Friston, 2018). The better we  know 
who “we” are, the less likely we  are to be  entrapped in 
prediction error. Being able to model the consequences of 
our actions means, we have models of a counterfactual future, 
and thus to choose how we  perceive the world and how to 
act on its affordances. The healthy brain is both prediction 
and action generator, constantly attempting to align perceived 
reality with internalized models (Bolis and Schilbach, 2017), 
including factoring in the self as a source of potential error 
and uncertainty. To the extent that psychotherapy helps its 
subjects to know themselves better, the more these processes 
will be  enhanced.
FEP holds that nested Markov blankets operate “all the way 
up” (Kirchhoff et al., 2018). Thus, the search for self-awareness 
points to a further level of the top-down/bottom-up hierarchy 
(Wilson, 2002): meta-cognition, the capacity to think about 
thinking, or mentalise (Frith, 2012). Mentalising is the capacity 
to stand outside oneself and scrutinize one’s–and others’–active 
inference. The processes by which we  populate our umwelt 
with objects, motivations and meanings operate below 
consciousness most of the time–until problems arise, as they 
inevitably do; given the complexity of the social and physical 
environments in which humans find themselves. This is especially 
true of the inherently unreliable nature of self-appraisal, and 
the related need to navigate the shared affective world of 
intimate others (see Rudrauf and Debbané, 2018 for the Projective 
Consciousness Model of such inference processes).
Frith (2012) argues that such metacognition is especially relevant 
to the cooperative or “we-mode” procedures, which occupy a 
great deal of human waking life. He cites a range of experimental 
evidence showing how inaccurate unmodulated self-appraisal can 
be–we cannot easily see ourselves as others see us. He has shown 
experimentally how two heads are better than one: “through 
discussions of our perceptual experiences with others, we  can 
detect sensory signals more accurately.” (Frith, 2012)
Active inference, if carried out jointly, surpasses lone attempts 
to reduce prediction error and forestall entropic surprise. 
Developmental studies show how an “intimate other”–typically 
an attachment figure – knows our self better than we can we know 
ourselves, and it is through this joint appraisal that our internal 
self-model becomes progressively refined in the course of 
psychological development (Moutoussis et al., 2014; Palmer et al., 
2015; Hamilton and Lind, 2016; Fotopoulou and Tsakiris, 2017). 
One of the roles of psychotherapy is to reactivate this process.
“Duets for One”14
This dyadic self slant takes us to the question: what happens 
when two Bayesian brains interact? Friston and Frith (2015) 
stake out the maths of this, using birdsong as a paradigm for 
dialogic “conversations.” The authors base their discussion on 
the phenomenon of “sensory attenuation” (Brown et  al., 2013), 
in which sensory feed-forward is inhibited during action, in 
order to preclude the log-jam that arises if bottom-up were 
to meet top-down in medias res.
This sensory attenuation is integral to “turn taking,” as a 
fundamental feature of human interactions, whether verbal or 
non-verbal (Holler et  al., 2015). One can either listen or talk, 
but not both. In intimate conversations one can, through the 
other’s ears, “hear,” and so come to know oneself better. If each 
agent assumes the other is “like” themselves, the boundaries between 
them are temporarily dissolved. Listening, the sensory input of 
A (i.e., “language,” verbal and non-verbal) can be  taken and 
“priored” (i.e., subjected to top-down predictions) as though it 
arose in B herself. This in turn leads to “action” (i.e., more speech), 
revised posteriors, and so on–a similar process applying to B vis-a-vis 
A. As Friston and Frith (2015, p.  14) put it, the result is
“a collective narrative that is shared among 
communicating agents (including oneself). For example, 
when in conversation or singing a duet, our beliefs about 
the (proprioceptive and auditory) sensations 
we experience are based upon expectations about the 
song. These beliefs transcend agency in the sense that 
the song (e.g., hymn) does not belong to you or me”
The resulting boundary dissolving synchrony of Friston and 
Frith’s birdsong model (i.e., “epistemic match”15) points the 
way to the nature of therapeutic conversations in psychotherapy. 
14 A phrase borrowed from Kempkinsy’s play of the same name and later 
film, a thinly described depiction of the life and illness of the cellist 
Jacqueline du Pre – including the questionable role of her psychiatrist!
15 Fonagy and Allison (2014) argue that relaxing epistemic vigilance is 
achieved in normal development through “prefacing” one’s communicative 
intents with ostensive cues. This validates the recipient as a subjective, 
agentive self. Once epistemic trust is stimulated in this way, the channel 
for the transmission of knowledge – learning about minds – is opened 
and an epistemic match (Fonagy, personal communication 2018) can 
be  created whereby one’s imagined self-narrative or feeling state can 
be  recognized in the way the other communicates their version thereof.
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The therapeutic “duet for one” helps bind potentially disruptive 
free energy in creative ways, fostering psychological resilience. 
It also provides a neuroscience account of the psychoanalytic 
notion of the “third” (Ogden, 1994), the phantasy-imbued 
conversation which arises between two intimate participants 
(i.e., analyst and analysand), contributed to by both, but 
pertaining to neither.
FREE ENERGY, ATTACHMENT, AND 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Free energy minimization describes how organisms adapt to 
unpredictable environments, forming a bulwark against entropy, 
and a springboard for survival and flourishing. But the negentropy 
which characterizes living organisms is inherently fragile. Given 
an entropic world, as the Red Queen famously puts it, “it 
takes all the running you  can do to stay in the same place. If 
you  want to get somewhere you  must run twice as fast….” 
(Carroll, 1871/2009).16
This fragility, arguably, is the basis of psychological illness/
psychopathology. Things can–and do–go wrong in a number 
of different ways (Solms, 2015; Powers et  al., 2018). First, 
there is the ever-present danger of “trauma.” Despite best laid 
plans, unpredictable, unforeseen, and deleterious environmental 
impingements can overwhelm prediction error minimization. 
As Freud put it:
“we describe as ‘traumatic’ any excitations from 
outside…powerful enough to break through the 
protective shield…and result in permanent disturbances 
of the manner in which the energy operates.” 
(Freud, 1925, p. 3)
The Markov boundaries (“blankets”) of body and mind form 
the basis for adaptive living. The environment is “taken in” in 
order that it may be  appraised and evaluated but also kept at 
bay so that it can be  manipulated to the organism’s advantage. 
The same goes for internally generated impingements, phantasies, 
demands, urges, or drives. In trauma, entropy, i.e., free energy 
unbound, takes over at a specific level of nested Markov blanket 
(for instance, the expectation of a safe or relatively predictable 
world). The mind is colonized by chaos and the potential for 
psychotic functioning increases if the thinking apparatus itself 
is overwhelmed, or as it might be put psychoanalytically, “attacked.” 
Trauma, from this perspective, exerts pressure for parameter 
adjustments in generative models to deal with increased complexity 
that arises from traumatic experiences (Hopkins, 2016).
Second, the capacity for active inference may be  impaired. 
Active inference, as the term implies, depends on agency and 
belief-updating. Both are skills, acquired and honed in the 
course of development and reflecting the role of caregivers, 
and thus vulnerable to environmental disruption. It is this 
16 The “Red Queen hypothesis” in evolutionary biology (Ridley, 1993) is 
used to account for the apparently wasteful phenomenon of sexual (“twice”) 
as opposed to asexual reproduction.
acquisition that underlies structure learning and building–in 
a familial and an encultured setting–the right sort of priors 
for explaining dyadic interactions with others and our own bodies.
Seen this way, psychopathology results either from the impact 
of overwhelming trauma, or when the capacity for active 
Bayesian inference is compromised. Here, the attachment 
ontogenetic schema for categorizing intimate relationships 
provides an evidential heuristic. Insecure attachments 
compromise active inference (Holmes and Slade, 2017): in the 
absence of an internal secure base (Holmes, 2010), exploration, 
physical and psychological, is curtailed. This limits the extent 
and range of sensory sampling of the environment, and so 
the variety of priors or hypotheses available to account for 
them. Both the “breaking” (i.e., creative destruction) of priors 
and the “making” (i.e., creative construction) of new ones are 
inhibited (c.f., Holmes, 2010; Leonidaki et  al., 2018).
In anxious or “hyperactivating” attachment, agency tends 
to be  absent or eroded. Rather than actively searching or 
changing their environment, sufferers remain passive in the 
face of loss, conflict, or trauma (Knox, 2010), a state famously 
described as “learned helplessness” (Maier and Seligman, 2016). 
Here, the self is suffused with unmodulated affect. In terms 
of structure learning, commitment to the single prior “nothing 
I  do will change anything” precludes epistemic affordance and 
the testing of alternative hypotheses. By contrast, the hallmark 
of deactivating, or dismissive attachments is repression and 
affect suppression. While this yields a measure of niche-specific 
security, it also renders the individual vulnerable to unexpected 
trauma or interpersonal friction, as well as precipitating health-
diminishing physiological changes.17
One of the “functions” of negative affect–fear, sadness, mental 
pain–is as signals of prediction error (c.f., Barrett, 2017; 
Solms, 2019), i.e., a discrepancy between top-down expectation 
and bottom-up signal–the wanted breast and the reality of its 
non-appearance. If, as in anxious attachment, negative effects 
are felt to be  un-minimizable this may lead to–or indeed 
constitute–psychological illness. In deactivating attachments 
there is a trade-off between free energy minimizing and 
complexity reduction. By placing interceptions beyond conscious 
awareness–and so beyond mentalising–the learning of adaptive 
structural “priors” is precluded.
Disorganized attachment is a proven precursor to later 
psychopathology including Borderline Personality Disorder 
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2012). Two main reasons have been 
identified. First is the low threshold for interpersonal distress 
typical of such individuals, which means that mentalising and 
so top-down modulation–free energy minimizing–of negative 
affect are inhibited (Nolte et al., 2013). Second, sufferers typically 
experience from “epistemic mistrust” (Fonagy and Allison, 2014), 
resulting in difficulties with the collaborative mentalising/social 
learning “duets” described above (Nolte et  al., 2019). In such 
a solipsistic world, deliberate self-harm, substance abuse or risky 
17 Avoidant infants separated from their care-giver appear unperturbed, 
but demonstrate raised cortisol and pulse rates suggestive of physiological 
stress (Bernard et  al., 2013) with potentially long-term adverse health 
implications.
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sex are self-soothing last resorts; however self-defeating. Bion’s 
(1962) “minus K”–i.e., the “active,” dynamically motivated wish 
not to know is also relevant. Selective sensory sampling (including 
interceptive input) which excludes new information means that 
simplistic, albeit dysfunctional models, of the world are maintained.
In all three patterns of insecure attachment, freedom is 
sacrificed for the sake of a degree of security. Freud defined 
neurosis as a turning away from reality. From a FE perspective, 
this can be  seen in terms of attempts to bind free energy by 
reducing complexity. Fixed beliefs about the world are clung 
to, rather than updated in the light of experience. The more 
precision–which may be  spurious–is afforded prior beliefs,18 
the less likely are new experiences sought in order to update 
generative models. A degree of negative capability,19 or creative 
not-knowing–and hence the need for exploration and innovation–
is thus built into the free energy formulation. In the Kleinian 
dichotomy, PSP (paranoid-schizoid position; Klein, 1946) 
represents a simplistic either/or good/bad model, while DP 
(depressive position; Klein, 1997) a more complex, whole and 
nuanced approximation to the world’s (epistemic and affective) 
affordances.
Parsimony20 plays an important role here, i.e., the need 
to reduce, Goldilocks fashion (neither too many nor too 
few), the chaotic multiplicity of possible predictions to a 
number of stable “attractors.”21 Such parsimonious models of 
the world must have value22, i.e., be of interest to the organism, 
and help with its project of survival, maintaining homeostasis, 
facilitating consciousness, staying safe, enhancing foraging 
potential, reproduction, etc. Their function ultimately is to 
minimize the affective manifestations of chronic 
prediction error.
On this reading, the free energy formulation is inherently 
motivational. This has psychotherapeutic relevance given that 
therapy is ultimately concerned with people’s needs, wishes, 
and wants (c.f., Hopkins, 2016). Moving toward complexity-
reducing, parsimonious attractors that enhance interpersonal 
satisfaction–and eluding self-fulfilling priors (e.g., learned 
helplessness) are markers for psychological health.23 Our 
contention is that the procedures of psychotherapy, and especially 
18 Thus, OCD can be thought of in FE terms as fruitless striving for spurious 
certainty. In a riposte to Socrates’ much-quoted aphorism that “the unexamined 
life is not worth living,” Dennett reminds us that “the over-examined life 
is nothing much to write home about either” (Dennett, 2017, p.  278).
19 Keats’ phrase to define the creative mind, popularised by Bion and much 
espoused by dynamic psychotherapists (e.g., Symington and Symington, 
1996).
20 Russell’s (2001) version of the Occam’s razor principle of parsimony is: 
“Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for 
inferences to unknown entities.” Thus, do we  try to calibrate how new 
experience A is “like” known event B – and how it differs.
21 In the mathematical analysis of non-linear systems, attractors are the 
set of numerical values toward which a system tends to evolve, from a 
wide variety of starting conditions. There is a possible link to the 
psychoanalytic notion of “fixation.”
22 For a detailed account of system/ego-centric, subjective values, and their 
role in transitions from proto to truly mental states as well as precision-
weighed uncertainty representation, see Solms (2019).
23 C.f., Einstein: “everything should be  made as simple as possible, but not 
simpler” (Reader’s Digest July 1977).
psychoanalytic variants, are well placed to enhance 
these processes.
HOW PSYCHOTHERAPY FOSTERS 
ACTIVE INFERENCE
Bio-Behavioral Synchrony Reduces 
“Surprise”
Bio-behavioral synchrony (Feldman, 2015a) refers to the 
physiological, endocrinological, and behavioral entraining 
characteristic of care-givers and their infants, and their 
developmental sequelae–and can be  seen as a prototype for 
life-long “duets for one.” The greater the synchrony in the first 
year of life, the more pro-social, exploratory, and less anxious 
the child is likely to be  at school entry (Feldman, 2015b).
Bio-behavioral synchrony takes place during “sensitive periods” 
(Tottenham, 2014) in which immature individuals are open 
to affect co-regulation, with the help of their care-givers. Thus, 
in the classic “visual cliff ” paradigm (Gibson and Walk, 1960), 
1-year-old children are more adventurous and take greater risks 
if their mothers are seen to be  encouraging and reassuring. 
This relational regulation is not confined to human mammals 
(Hofer, 2002). In the presence of their mothers, rat pups show 
interest in–rather than aversion to–strong odors, compared to 
those separated from their mothers at birth, and when mature 
show diminished startle reflexes and greater exploratory drive.
Secure attachment transmits epistemic trust as a springboard 
for social and physical exploration cross the life cycle. Coan 
et  al. (2006) and Coan (2016) studied happily married couples 
in their “hand-holding” experiments. The wives were exposed 
to stress–the threat of a mild electric shock–while being observed 
in an fMRI scanner. Markers of HPA axis arousal were minimal 
or non-existent when holding their husbands’ hands as compared 
with facing the threat on their own. From a free energy 
perspective, prediction error is lessened in these dyadic scenarios. 
Instead of a fast track (Kahneman, 2011), low-precision “danger” 
attractor, in the “duet for one” scenario, the potential free 
energy of threat is minimized. The “victim’s” threat-induced 
arousal does not directly impact the hand-holding husband’s 
HPA axis, who is thereby able to bring “top-down” reassurance 
into the shared experience. Undertaken together, the whole 
mini-trauma becomes negligible. The husband’s bound energy 
pathways transmit the thought to his wife: “the experimenter 
is not really going to do anything nasty to us.”24
Clients entering psychotherapy have typically had reduced 
sensitive periods of affiliative learning in their developmental 
histories, or, worse, attachment bonds reinforced not by 
collaboration and pleasure but by aversive stimuli. (Hofer, 2002). 
Many, especially those with a history of disorganized attachment, 
are on “hair trigger” for overwhelming anxiety (Allen et al., 2008). 
They are in the grip of perceptual distortion and ingrained 
24 The notorious “Milgram” (1974) experiments can be  thought of in 
comparable terms. Those able to resist the seemingly sadistic urgings of 
the experimenter were using agency and top-down internal feedback–“I 
am  under no obligation to continue with this.”
Holmes and Nolte Bayesian Brain and Psychotherapy
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 March 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 592
prediction errors, driven by the need for a modicum of 
attachment security, however dysfunctional. An early task 
therefore in psychotherapy is to re-establish a degree of 
bio-behavioral synchrony. The patterns and rhythms of therapy 
help with this, as do the joint attention and affective mirroring 
(Holmes and Slade, 2017) typical of secure attachments. The 
more disturbed the individual, the longer this is likely to 
take–and it remains a fluctuating process varying from session 
to session and moment-to-moment within sessions.
Action is the prime means for improving the prediction 
and predictability of sensory sampling and thus minimizing 
prediction error. Clients suffering from depression are often 
in the thrall of cognitive errors that dominate their affective 
world: “everyone hates me,” “I am  useless,” etc. These self-
perpetuating–albeit parsimonious–priors not only bind free 
energy but also undermine agency and the ensuing accuracy 
of predictions. Passive helplessness pervades, interspersed with 
depressive auto-denigration. The “hand-holding” help of a 
therapist fosters action, initially in the form of verbal exploration. 
When things go well, depressive priors begin to be  revised in 
the light of experience.
Bio-behavioral synchrony and the fostering of agency are 
probably common to all effective therapies. The remainder of 
our discussion focuses a free energy perspective on 
psychoanalytic therapies. Here, the role of “action” is less 
evident compared, say, with cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), 
although the impulse to act–or “act out”–is an important focus 
for transferential and counter-transferential work. Indeed, 
choosing to seek help for psychological difficulties in itself 
implies a degree of agency. Furthermore, if conversation is 
seen in terms of “speech acts” analytic dialogue is in itself 
agency-enhancing.
DECOUPLING
We will touch on a number of key features of the analytic 
approach: free association, dreams, sexuality, reflective discourse, 
transference, and mentalising. All depend on “decoupling”–
introducing a degree of “play” into the bottom-up/top-down 
surprise-minimizing articulations of everyday life (c.f., Holmes 
and Slade, 2017). In the presence of a modulating, moderating, 
affect-buffering therapist, surprise/energy unbound becomes 
tolerable and, when therapeutically scrutinized, extends the 
repertoire and range of a person’s counterfactual realities, 
i.e., priors. Built into this model is both “creativity” and 
“destruction,” in the sense that modification of error-prone 
priors entails their replacement with alternative hypotheses. 
The greater the range of prior hypotheses, the greater the 
opportunities for error-minimized binding and the less the 
need to resort to rigid, limited, or anachronistic priors, at the 
different levels of a hierarchy of generative models. This, in 
turn, enhances the adaptedness of the sufferer to their 
environment, including, via mentalising, the self. Part of the 
process makes the patient’s model more accurate by revised 
belief-formation, and part by complexity reduction, especially 
in relation to resolution of conflict and trauma (Hopkins, 2016).
Decoupling From “Below”: Free 
Association
Reducing prediction error is a complex multi-level and recursive 
process that reverberates up and down a series of interconnected 
message-passing hierarchies. “Bottom-up” does not refer simply 
to activity at sensory epithelia, but at each level of synaptic 
connection in a nested hierarchy of message-passing within 
canonical microcircuits throughout the brain. For example, 
Lanius et  al. (2015) discuss decoupling between Prefrontal 
Cortex (PFC) and amygdala in post-traumatic states, and how, 
in the absence of top-down input from the PFC, patients 
attempt to dampen amygdala activity by resorting to substance 
abuse or self-harm. Observing these processes in a therapeutic 
setting forms a first step toward establishing reconnection and 
enhancing modulation of raw affect.
Barratt (2016) argues that Freud’s greatest discovery, clinically 
and theoretically, was the concept and practice of “free 
association.” Freud’s (1916) image of this was that of the 
passenger in a train looking out of a window and observing 
the view as it flashes past. In free association, thoughts, 
interoceptive bodily sensations and effects, impulses, and images 
enter the mind “from below.” As analysand and therapist 
collaboratively enter states of free-floating attention and negative 
capability, top-down constructions are temporarily set aside. 
Avoidant clients, with intellectual defenses, are both resistant 
to, and especially likely to benefit from joint attention to such 
free-associative experiences. With their co-regulatory sensitive 
period re-opened, they can explicitly attend to repressed feelings 
and fears. Free energy can now be  minimized through prior 
modification and simulated action rather than repression. As 
in the study by Coan et  al. (2006), the therapist’s calming, 
containing, “slow-thinking” conversational presence generates 
“forms of feeling” (Mears, 2018), which the sufferer can discern 
and grasp rather than fearfully evade.
“Action Replay”
A crucial technique in the mentalising approach to psychotherapy 
with people suffering from Borderline Personality Disorder is 
a procedure known as “pressing the pause button” (Allen et al., 
2008), when therapist and client interrupt the flow of their 
interactions in order to examine “what was going on between 
us just now.” This disrupts automatic top-down/bottom-up 
pathways, making thoughts and behaviors available for scrutiny. 
An “event”–e.g., a client’s sudden outburst of anger triggered 
by a therapist’s holiday–may stimulate prolonged collaborative 
reflection, encompassing previous comparable interpersonal 
experiences. The client begins to tease out differences between 
a therapeutic “break” with a high probability of resumption, 
and a childhood history of being arbitrarily abandoned, leading 
to more complex and realistic posteriors about the reversibility 
of loss.
Dreams
During hours of dark, prediction errors inevitably increase. 
Applying the free energy model to the neurobiology of sleep, 
Hobson and Friston (2012) suggest that, when dreaming, 
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bottom-up sensory input and top-down prediction are de-coupled. 
In the absence of afferent input, potentially free-energetic–and 
so entropic–memory traces of the “days residue”25 can be “bound” 
into parsimonious representations. Via synaptic pruning and 
consolidation of themes of affective significance, this 
“housekeeping” process reduces the chaotic complexity of 
everyday waking life.
Although this approach does not fully endorse the Freudian 
notion of dreams as disguised wish fulfillments, it sees dream 
themes as value-laden, replete with affective saliences which have 
not reached waking conscious awareness (c.f., Solms, 2013). At 
the same time, dreaming embodies counter-factual simulation 
or virtual reality generation. Triggered by the day’s residue, 
possible future scenarios are played out in dreams helping to 
build a repertoire of free-energy minimizing priors, able to reduce 
prediction error when encountering future potentially traumatic 
events.26 This process does not forestall emotional pain, but 
safeguards against, or at least postpones entropic surprise. Anything 
and everything is possible, thereby arming the dreamer against 
the unpredictability–improbabilities–of life.27 Freud excluded 
undisguised trauma-related dreams from his wish-fulfillment 
theory. From a free energy perspective, dreaming reworks trauma 
so that it becomes “thinkable”: “only a dream,” or “that was 
then, inescapable, horrible; this is now, still painful, but tolerable” 
(Kinley and Reyno, 2017).
Transference
In the “flapping black object” example, an ambiguous stimulus 
presented itself to the subject, who saw something “untoward” 
out of the corner of his eye. Given the high degree of imprecision 
intrinsic to peripheral vision, this was interpreted in the light 
of plausible “prior” based on the previous day’s experience–a 
possible poisoned bird. Disambiguation (Seth, 2015) followed: 
face-forward movement toward the object led to a revised 
“posterior.” This illustrated how an interoceptive anxiety (“my 
nausea suggests that the bird could also have been poisoned 
by the weed spray”) could shape an erroneous prior, leading 
to a maladaptive “perception,” in which a picture of the world 
appropriate to the past (here the previous day) was carried 
over, or transferred, inappropriately, into the present.
According to Laplanche (2009, p.  93) “the analyst is the 
one who guards the enigma and provokes the transference.” 
In his terms, the analyst is–like the world glimpsed in peripheral 
vision–an “enigmatic signifier,” not perhaps an entirely “blank 
slate,” but nevertheless embodying the reticence –creative 
ambiguity–inherent in analytic technique. Drawing on that 
ambiguity for therapeutic ends, the analyst receives and helps 
25 Freud’s term.
26 This account of dreaming can be  compared to immunization in which 
overwhelming infection is prevented via prior exposure to attenuated forms 
of potential pathogens.
27 Another parallel is with Bayesian weather forecasting. In the “numerical 
modeling method,” the computer, “top-down,” generates a large number 
of possible future weather patterns based on small differences in prior 
assumptions (Seth, 2014). Accuracy of priors is iteratively improved by 
posterior revisions which feed into the next day’s forecast, and so on.
identify the patient’s projected object relations or unconscious 
phantasies.28
From a free energy perspective, transference is an entrenched 
“prior,” inaccessible to updating via active inference. In the classic 
Kleinian concept of “projective identification” (PI) (e.g., Ogden, 
1992/2018), transference is jointly enacted by therapist and client. 
PI can be  conceptualized in free energy terms as an attempt 
to shape the interpersonal world in the light of pre-existing 
phantasies, rather than to revise priors in the light of experience. 
For example, a therapist might “forget” to inform a PI-driven 
client about an upcoming break, having been induced unconsciously 
by the client’s expectation of abandonment actually to do so.
But–exemplifying psychoanalysis’ paradoxical capacity to 
snatch success from the jaws of defeat–such enactments also 
have the potential, as Winnicott (1974, p.  107) puts it, to 
“bring trauma within the arena of omnipotence” and hence 
be  available for therapeutic work. The FEP point here is that 
one way to minimize surprise is actively to shape or seek out 
environments in accordance with one’s priors, thereby eliminating 
the necessity to update them. Recognizing and exploring 
projective identification observes this process in action and 
offers a more flexible range of options for living out one’s 
relationships. A crucial prerequisite is the therapist’s 
countertransference awareness (Brenman Pick, 1985, 2018)–the 
capacity to be  objective about one’s own subjectivity.
Sexuality
The FEP is inherently temporal: sensation stimulates a prior, 
leading to perception and, via active inference, posterior revision. 
In the example, it was a “relief ” to realize that the putative 
bird was a figment of imagination. In this FEP account, there 
is an affective arc of motivated tension, consummation, and 
resolution, in which the very binding of energy is rewarding. 
By deepening trust and discouraging premature closure of 
surprise, therapy fosters this expansion of the realm of desire.
Put another way–ambiguity and its resolution is both exciting 
and rewarding. To return to Laplanche (1987), enigma–which 
can be  reformulated in this context as prediction error–is 
central to this process. In his neo-Oedipal model, the “breast” 
is a “sexual organ,” but, for the naïve infant, one wrapped in 
mystery. The mother’s loving sensuality in relation to her baby 
is suffused with a degree of eroticism which the child cannot 
fully comprehend.
Building on this, Target (2007) suggests that sexuality is 
the outstanding exception to the observation that joint attention 
and accurate affect-mirroring by caregivers underpins the 
development of the child’s sense of self (Fonagy et  al., 2002). 
In the realm of genital sexuality, parents typically distract, 
avoid, or punish rather than directly reflect the child’s explorations 
and feelings of excitement. This, Target argues, leaves a residue 
of mirroring-hunger, whose resolution is postponed until sexual 
life begins in adolescence, and a suitable partner/other is found 
with whom a sexual duet for one can begin to be  played. 
With its recurrent rhythms of desire and resolution, sexuality 
28 E.g., Patient: “have you got any children?”; Analyst: “that’s a really interesting 
question–I wonder what has prompted it to come up today?”.
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remains suffused with a continuing ambiance of enigma. Part 
of the mystery and paradox of sex is the tension between the 
fact that one can never fully “know” the other, and yet, through 
sex (genital and in any of the ontologically derived adult 
expressions of infantile, polymorphously perverse sexualities), 
one approaches their intimate being.29 In FEP terms, sex “plays” 
with energy bound and unbound and their relationship to, 
among others, the reward system.
When sexuality permeates the analytic relationship as erotic 
transference, the “decoupling” virtual reality ambiance of 
psychoanalytic work, enables such feelings to be  jointly 
mentalised, thereby enabling clients to develop a more explicit 
sense of the lineaments of their desires.
Therapeutic Conversations
While underpinned by pre-verbal bio-behavioral synchrony, 
psychotherapy is in essence a specialized form of conversation, 
or proto-conversation (Mears, 2018). Based on Strachey’s (1934) 
classical paper on the “mutative interpretation,” Lear (2011) 
suggests that change in psychoanalysis relies on the interplay 
between two conservational vectors. First is the mirroring and 
role-responsiveness as the analyst enters into patients’ “idiolect,” 
helping to delineate their unique way of seeing world and 
self-stamped vernacular, always trying to find the right words 
to capture the patient’s “forms of feeling,” without imposing 
her or his own emotional vocabulary. At this stage, from the 
patient’s point of view, the top-down/bottom-up process runs 
smoothly, and, from a free energy perspective, un-“surprisingly.”
But at some point, a discrepancy (or ambiguity) will inevitably 
arise, as the analyst fails to conform to the patient’s top-down 
expectations. In the Strachey’s 1930s account, the feared punitive 
father turns out to be  benign; in a contemporary version, a 
patient’s view of her analyst as abusive (“you’re just getting off 
on my misery; you don’t really give a damn”) might be confounded 
by a degree of compassionate and committed concern. Conversely, 
patients’ assumption that their therapists will be  all-loving or 
all-forgiving comes up against confrontations, inflexible endings 
to sessions, the need to pay fees, etc. In the face of this discrepancy 
between desire and reality, patients do their best to maintain 
the status quo, clinging to past assumptions, attempting to evade 
the need to bind free energy with revised priors. This discrepancy 
then becomes the point d’appui of psychotherapeutic work.
From a free energy perspective, psychological ill health 
implies simplistic top-down models, and/or restricted sensory 
sampling, while structured complexity, as opposed to chaos 
or rigidity, is a mark of psychological health. Psychotherapy 
aims to increase the repertoire of its subjects’ models of 
themselves and their environment. It is no mean task for 
analysts to challenge their patients, to break the mold of 
maladaptive energy binding, and to move psychic structures 
toward this augmented complexity. It is tempting to collude, 
29 FEP accounts for the impossibility of self-tickling (e.g., Hohwy, 2016) 
on the grounds that top-down priors thwart the necessary unexpectedness 
of a tickle. A similar argument could be  mounted to explain the 
unsatisfactoriness of masturbation as opposed to relational sex.
“supportively” maintaining the status quo, or gratefully (if 
silently) accepting the drop-out of a “difficult” patient. Yet 
from a Bayesian perspective, Moutoussis et  al. (2018) suggest 
that complexity is crucial to treatment success: too much, and 
there is no generalization from good therapeutic experiences 
to blighted everyday lives; but if complexity is simplistically 
minimized, this inhibits the risk-taking and “negative capability” 
needed for psychic change.
Recent research by Talia and his group (Talia et  al., 2014, 
2018) lends further experimental support to this model and 
to the attachment categories discussed earlier. Analyzing 
transcripts of psychotherapy sessions, they show how the nature 
of therapeutic dialogue depends on the attachment status of 
both client and therapist. Securely attached clients–and therapists–
engage in turn-taking “duets,” in which there is contact seeking, 
free exchange and modulation of affect and ideas. By contrast, 
insecurely attached people typically rebuff mutative speech acts. 
Their dialogue tends to be  non-relational, with little affect-
modulation, frequent backtracking, and repetitive 
interactive patterns.
The partial or occasionally total impasse created by these 
insecure speech patterns then becomes the focus of therapy. 
Painful affects–anxiety or misery–signal prediction errors, 
misalignment between wish and reality. But rather than leading 
to change, these become chronic and embedded. Psychotherapy 
mobilizes the active inference needed to resolve the impasse. 
The therapist enjoins the client to look at–mentalise–what is 
happening between them. Knowing that his or her hand is 
being metaphorically held, and that energy binding can 
be  temporarily left to the therapist, the client can become 
more adventurous. In “duet for one” moments, initially fleetingly, 
therapist and client “sing” in ways that pertain to each and 
neither participant. Classical analytic geometry may encourage 
this–prone, in the absence of visual contact, patients take their 
analysts as part of themselves, drawing on the other’s “priors”–i.e., 
verbal “interpretations”–to widen the range of available top-down 
models of the world and its possibilities.
CONCLUSION
In a perhaps slightly disingenuous moment of self-doubt, 
Friston (2010, p.  9) asks:
“What does the free-energy principle portend for the 
future? If its main contribution is to integrate established 
theories, then the answer is probably ‘not a lot’…[But 
it] could also provide new approaches to old problems 
that might call for a reappraisal of conventional notions.”
Wiese (2015) argues that while FEP may in a Popperian 
sense be  “unfalsifiable,” it nevertheless represents a Kuhnian 
new paradigm. Our enthusiasm for the free energy model 
comes from the position of psychotherapy ecumenicalism (c.f., 
Holmes, 2002; Wampold, 2015; Holmes and Slade, 2017). 
We  have argued that recovery from psychological ill-health 
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is associated with enhancing the capacity to bind free energy 
and thereby facilitate prediction error minimization. Therapeutic 
procedures which foster these will be  likely to be  helpful, 
whatever their espoused brand name. These include the following: 
promoting agency; broadened sensory and interoceptive 
sampling, whether through CBT “experiments” or psychoanalytic 
free association; widening counter-factual simulation and the 
range of top-down hypotheses through dream-analysis and 
transference work; and fostering the capacity to modify priors 
in the light of experience, especially through the analysis 
of transference.
We have outlined some of the established interpersonal 
procedures which pave the way for these: bio-behavioral 
synchrony, epistemic trust, and turn-taking duet-for-one dialogue. 
From a research perspective, these features can be operationalized 
as benchmarks for assessing psychotherapy efficacy and 
procedural compliance. They help concentrate therapists and 
their supervisors’ minds, and, we  predict, improve 
clinical outcomes.
A final point in favor of the FEP is that it conceives 
psychotherapy, not as an esoteric concoction, but as a “natural 
kind,” a specialized form of a general cultural phenomenon. 
Many aspects of cultural life–play, music, sport, drama, and 
iconography–depend on the top-down/bottom-up “decoupling” 
and mentalising which foster prediction error minimization,30 
and so enhance recovery and resilience.
30 The actor-audience divide decouples meaning from action in a variant 
of Coan’s hand-holding. Watching Shakespearean tragedy (Holmes, 2018)–or 
indeed a “horror movie”–extends the repertoire of top-down priors available 
for energy binding if and when real-life trauma strikes.
The homeostasis–psychological no less than physiological–
essential, in Claude Bernard’s (1974) famous phrase, to a free 
life, is vulnerable to the ever-present forces of entropy. The 
discrepancies between the affordances of the environment–which 
in our species’ case is primarily interpersonal–and our inner 
models is the basis of prediction error, signaled by affective 
distress, leading, if unrevised, to entrenched mental pain or 
psychological illness. Learning to experience and resolve 
prediction error depends on the generative possibilities of 
intimate relationships. Where those fail or falter, psychotherapy 
provides a vital route to repair.
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